Wall Steert ,Iraq's Maliki On Challenges
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sat down with The Wall Street Journal's Gina Chon recently for an hourlong discussion at his office in Baghdad's International Zone ahead of his U.S. visit this week. Read an edited portion of the interview in which he talked about the security and political challenges, power sharing and his vision for the next Iraqi elections. (More from the interview.)
* * *
The Wall Street Journal: What were the things that happened in Iraq that was the turning point for you, that allowed you to finally do the things you wanted to do as the leader of this country? Was it the surge, the Sunni Awakening, what can you point to?
Nouri al-Maliki
Nouri al-Maliki: For sure the majority inside and outside Iraq, they had fears that we could not change things in Iraq. For the bad circumstances and after the explosion of Samarra, the roads between the provinces were broken, and the sectarian situation became a big thing in Iraq. And al Qaeda was able to establish bases and prisons in Iraq. The most dangerous thing we faced is that Iraqis had lost their hope to have a normal life here. This was the picture of Iraq on May 21 [2006] when I became prime minister. For me, it was not really obvious how we can work to resolve this and what was the time we needed to heal. The plans and thoughts we had were for the long term, not the way some people thought of moving very fast because we had too many challenges; outer interference, and nationalism wasn't strong.
There was destruction and corruption at our institutions. Electricity stations were destroyed, bridges were broken, factories were not working, mosques were destroyed. Of course, this will give desperation to Iraqi citizens. I was not desperate at all in facing these challenges. But I was sure this would need time and a lot of effort. And I thought at the beginning that it depends on basic things. First, we needed reconciliation and the help of the people and tribal leaders. Second, expanding the abilities of the police and the army. Third, to take out the Baathists, al Qaeda and bad members from the security forces. Also the Americans have to take the other side of the responsibility on these things. So the decision of increasing the number of security forces happened in a meeting between me and [President George W.] Bush in Jordan. The first meeting was to limit the increasing of numbers, but it was obvious we needed security forces on every quarter meter of road. So the two sides worked at the same time in their own way. So on our side, it was getting rid of bad members in our security forces, and on the American side, it was increasing the number of security forces and supporting the Iraqi forces. In fact, the cooperation between the Iraqi government and American forces was highly coordinated. The successes we made were shared between us and the U.S. and that allowed us to make progress.
WSJ: Did you feel at that time you were almost alone in facing this? Because at the same time you were facing all these security challenges, there were political forces that were not supportive of you and wanted to replace you? There were many attempts to bring no-confidence votes against you.
Mr. Maliki: The political operations also had a lot of difficulties, the same level of challenges that we faced in security. Our partners in political operations were either with or supporting what they called the resistance or opposition. So opposing the government weakens the government. But, by efforts of the believers in government, we were able to pass that. And the problem is that the militias and insurgents were working under cover or supported by people inside the political establishment. And this was the most difficult thing we faced. How can we face al Qaeda, terrorists and the militias when they have support inside the government? Then the attempts to bring down the government when the two blocs withdrew from the government. But the good thing was some ministers in these two blocs refused to leave the government, so they didn't participate in this conspiracy. Also, at some points there was cohesion between the government and some of the blocs, like the Kurdistan and UIA blocs to support the government. The tribal leaders also started to fight al Qaeda. This was started by the agreement of the late Abdul Sattar Abu Risha and this became what we call Sawha [the Awakening]. So the Sons of Iraq [what the Awakening later became] supported the security forces and Iraq. Then the sides that withdrew from the government, when they found they could not bring down the government, they came back again. This was a victory for the government.
WSJ: After going through these difficult periods, what gave you the idea of going to Basra, Amarah and Sadr City? Even though security had improved, even the Americans were telling you not to go and you went on your own. What made you believe this was something you had to do and that you personally had to go to Basra to oversee the operations?
Mr. Maliki: I tried to change the situation in Basra by changing the leadership there more than two times because I was busy in Baghdad, and Baghdad is the capital and I had a lot of work here. But when the security situation improved in Baghdad, it became worse in Basra because the militias ran away from Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf and went to Basra. Basra became a powerful place for militias to smuggle oil and do other things. The elite of Basra called me and said they would leave Basra "if you do not help us." I told them, "Give me three days." I had a meeting with the ministers of defense, interior and other security people. First, we made the decision on the Iraqi side, not with the Americans. But because they are our partners in security, we had a meeting with them. They were not so eager for this work. They thought this was risky and this operation needed six months for planning. We told them, "The decision has been made and we will go." They told us, "We will support you for what you need." And the forces went from Baghdad and Anbar and it was a very big fight because the militias were really entrenched there and they had different kinds of weapons. And they moved their members to other places in Iraq, like Sadr City, Amarah, Diwaniyah. But our decision was to end this thing. When we were done in Basra, either the militias ran away or surrendered, and we went back to Baghdad, especially to Sadr City. The aim of these militias in Basra and Sadr City was to bring down the government. When I came back form Basra, I ordered to continue the siege in Sadr City because Sadr City shot the [International Zone] with 720 rockets in one month. Again the American side said, "We need 11 months to control Sadr City." We told them it would not need more than two or three weeks. And the siege continued although the American side and some NGOs said this would hurt people in Sadr City. But the people of Sadr City were calling us, telling us to continue with our work even if we are hurt. Of course, we did not want to hurt them, but they said they wanted to be rid of these militias. Even shop owners in Sadr City, they said, "Even if our shops were burned, it's not important." The important thing was getting rid of these gangs and militias. We kept pressing on them. And everything was ended in Sadr City and the security situation became better. Security forces entered Sadr City, and the provincial elections started and people of Sadr City voted for 302, the list of Maliki.
WSJ: After those operations, you won the praise of Sunnis and Kurds for going after your own sect, for going after Shia militias. But then it turned into people saying the prime minister has become too strong and is like a dictator. And some people still say that you are too sectarian. What do you think of the fact that when you first came to power, people said you were too weak and now people are saying you have become a dictator?
Mr. Maliki: Saying I'm too weak or too strong exposes the commitment to patriotism and nationalism of some blocs. When I became strong and implemented the rule of law but not in a sectarian way, I did not start to strike Sunnis, I struck at Shias. I did not strike only at al Qaeda and just leave the militias alone. But the strength I got is for their benefit, for the benefit of their families, for security. My strength is for them, not against them. I risked my life when I went to Basra. I may be killed at any time. I was not like other politicians in their air-conditioned rooms. I risked my life and some of my military advisers were killed in Basra. The second step is to participate in elections in a democratic country. And no one can say Maliki faked the results of the election. As a result, my list won in 10 provinces and 10 provincial governors are from my list. Isn't this democracy? But because of this, some people from some political blocs became haters and envious that Maliki's list became strong in the elections and he himself is strong now. They are trying to conspire against or delay the political operations. But to be fair, some of the political blocs now realize or understand that this was for their benefit. And the Iraqi people now understand who is just talking and who is talking and doing. Let's go back to Basra. Even at that time, the American forces called me many times to come back to Baghdad because they said it was too dangerous there. But I was firm in my response: "I will not come back to Baghdad unless we either won the battle in Basra or because I've been killed." Everybody wanted to drag me back to Baghdad. They said, "Baghdad needs you also." I told them, "If I don't win in Basra, there will be no Baghdad."
WSJ: Do you feel like you've changed from 2006 to now? In the beginning, you said you didn't ask to be prime minister, it was a burden for you. But in the provincial elections, you seemed to embrace your role as prime minister and the leader of your list. Maybe you don't enjoy your role now, but perhaps you are more comfortable being prime minister?
Mr. Maliki: I wasn't afraid or thought it was dangerous for me to be prime minister. But being prime minister was not something I wanted to be. It's not because I'm afraid of responsibility. Frankly, I was forced to be prime minister, but I didn't want the country to be without a prime minister for a long time. I was under pressure from all the blocs, the Sunnis, Shias, the Kurds. For more than a month, I was very upset and I felt uncomfortable. I did have other plans inside [the] parliament, some related to me and some related to the party. But at least now I can say that I've done something for my country so I feel better about it.
WSJ: You seem to disagree with people who say you have too much power and you control too many things. You talk about how this power-sharing system slows things down, the ministers are not from your party and don't listen to you. What are the reasons you think you actually don't have enough power?
Mr. Maliki: The management of the country is more difficult now than the security situation because of the power sharing and accordance policy. The minister feels like he is responsible to his bloc, not to the prime minister or the government. But I'm working on ministries and other places to end this power sharing, which is delaying the performance and work of the government. I'm working on canceling the accordance democracy. It doesn't mean that anyone who wins in the elections deserves a place in the ministries. Like any bloc who has 50 plus one can constitute the ministry but if he doesn't have 50 plus one, he should cooperate or have a coalition with another party to get this 50 plus one. If you can't get this, you should just work in parliament and not have a ministry.
WSJ: What is your vision for the next elections and do you really believe you can put together a national list with different sects, different religions, and different ethnicities when there are still problems between all these groups that are dividing them?
Mr. Maliki: The past elections depended on ethnicities or sects and this is very dangerous in political operations. This was something important to establish the political operations in the past, but now there is no need for this. So we should head to a national project. And the national project can include all the sides, Sunni, Shias, Kurds, Christians because it doesn't depend on identity. It's just important that he believes in the unity and sovereignty of Iraq.
So now when I announce the national project and wrote the principles of this project, I found there are no differences between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. And what makes the national project stronger is that I practiced this idea by myself because I've taken on everyone, Sunnis and Shias. This proves that I work on a national project
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1248...cle-outset-box
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sat down with The Wall Street Journal's Gina Chon recently for an hourlong discussion at his office in Baghdad's International Zone ahead of his U.S. visit this week. Read an edited portion of the interview in which he talked about the security and political challenges, power sharing and his vision for the next Iraqi elections. (More from the interview.)
* * *
The Wall Street Journal: What were the things that happened in Iraq that was the turning point for you, that allowed you to finally do the things you wanted to do as the leader of this country? Was it the surge, the Sunni Awakening, what can you point to?
Nouri al-Maliki
Nouri al-Maliki: For sure the majority inside and outside Iraq, they had fears that we could not change things in Iraq. For the bad circumstances and after the explosion of Samarra, the roads between the provinces were broken, and the sectarian situation became a big thing in Iraq. And al Qaeda was able to establish bases and prisons in Iraq. The most dangerous thing we faced is that Iraqis had lost their hope to have a normal life here. This was the picture of Iraq on May 21 [2006] when I became prime minister. For me, it was not really obvious how we can work to resolve this and what was the time we needed to heal. The plans and thoughts we had were for the long term, not the way some people thought of moving very fast because we had too many challenges; outer interference, and nationalism wasn't strong.
There was destruction and corruption at our institutions. Electricity stations were destroyed, bridges were broken, factories were not working, mosques were destroyed. Of course, this will give desperation to Iraqi citizens. I was not desperate at all in facing these challenges. But I was sure this would need time and a lot of effort. And I thought at the beginning that it depends on basic things. First, we needed reconciliation and the help of the people and tribal leaders. Second, expanding the abilities of the police and the army. Third, to take out the Baathists, al Qaeda and bad members from the security forces. Also the Americans have to take the other side of the responsibility on these things. So the decision of increasing the number of security forces happened in a meeting between me and [President George W.] Bush in Jordan. The first meeting was to limit the increasing of numbers, but it was obvious we needed security forces on every quarter meter of road. So the two sides worked at the same time in their own way. So on our side, it was getting rid of bad members in our security forces, and on the American side, it was increasing the number of security forces and supporting the Iraqi forces. In fact, the cooperation between the Iraqi government and American forces was highly coordinated. The successes we made were shared between us and the U.S. and that allowed us to make progress.
WSJ: Did you feel at that time you were almost alone in facing this? Because at the same time you were facing all these security challenges, there were political forces that were not supportive of you and wanted to replace you? There were many attempts to bring no-confidence votes against you.
Mr. Maliki: The political operations also had a lot of difficulties, the same level of challenges that we faced in security. Our partners in political operations were either with or supporting what they called the resistance or opposition. So opposing the government weakens the government. But, by efforts of the believers in government, we were able to pass that. And the problem is that the militias and insurgents were working under cover or supported by people inside the political establishment. And this was the most difficult thing we faced. How can we face al Qaeda, terrorists and the militias when they have support inside the government? Then the attempts to bring down the government when the two blocs withdrew from the government. But the good thing was some ministers in these two blocs refused to leave the government, so they didn't participate in this conspiracy. Also, at some points there was cohesion between the government and some of the blocs, like the Kurdistan and UIA blocs to support the government. The tribal leaders also started to fight al Qaeda. This was started by the agreement of the late Abdul Sattar Abu Risha and this became what we call Sawha [the Awakening]. So the Sons of Iraq [what the Awakening later became] supported the security forces and Iraq. Then the sides that withdrew from the government, when they found they could not bring down the government, they came back again. This was a victory for the government.
WSJ: After going through these difficult periods, what gave you the idea of going to Basra, Amarah and Sadr City? Even though security had improved, even the Americans were telling you not to go and you went on your own. What made you believe this was something you had to do and that you personally had to go to Basra to oversee the operations?
Mr. Maliki: I tried to change the situation in Basra by changing the leadership there more than two times because I was busy in Baghdad, and Baghdad is the capital and I had a lot of work here. But when the security situation improved in Baghdad, it became worse in Basra because the militias ran away from Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf and went to Basra. Basra became a powerful place for militias to smuggle oil and do other things. The elite of Basra called me and said they would leave Basra "if you do not help us." I told them, "Give me three days." I had a meeting with the ministers of defense, interior and other security people. First, we made the decision on the Iraqi side, not with the Americans. But because they are our partners in security, we had a meeting with them. They were not so eager for this work. They thought this was risky and this operation needed six months for planning. We told them, "The decision has been made and we will go." They told us, "We will support you for what you need." And the forces went from Baghdad and Anbar and it was a very big fight because the militias were really entrenched there and they had different kinds of weapons. And they moved their members to other places in Iraq, like Sadr City, Amarah, Diwaniyah. But our decision was to end this thing. When we were done in Basra, either the militias ran away or surrendered, and we went back to Baghdad, especially to Sadr City. The aim of these militias in Basra and Sadr City was to bring down the government. When I came back form Basra, I ordered to continue the siege in Sadr City because Sadr City shot the [International Zone] with 720 rockets in one month. Again the American side said, "We need 11 months to control Sadr City." We told them it would not need more than two or three weeks. And the siege continued although the American side and some NGOs said this would hurt people in Sadr City. But the people of Sadr City were calling us, telling us to continue with our work even if we are hurt. Of course, we did not want to hurt them, but they said they wanted to be rid of these militias. Even shop owners in Sadr City, they said, "Even if our shops were burned, it's not important." The important thing was getting rid of these gangs and militias. We kept pressing on them. And everything was ended in Sadr City and the security situation became better. Security forces entered Sadr City, and the provincial elections started and people of Sadr City voted for 302, the list of Maliki.
WSJ: After those operations, you won the praise of Sunnis and Kurds for going after your own sect, for going after Shia militias. But then it turned into people saying the prime minister has become too strong and is like a dictator. And some people still say that you are too sectarian. What do you think of the fact that when you first came to power, people said you were too weak and now people are saying you have become a dictator?
Mr. Maliki: Saying I'm too weak or too strong exposes the commitment to patriotism and nationalism of some blocs. When I became strong and implemented the rule of law but not in a sectarian way, I did not start to strike Sunnis, I struck at Shias. I did not strike only at al Qaeda and just leave the militias alone. But the strength I got is for their benefit, for the benefit of their families, for security. My strength is for them, not against them. I risked my life when I went to Basra. I may be killed at any time. I was not like other politicians in their air-conditioned rooms. I risked my life and some of my military advisers were killed in Basra. The second step is to participate in elections in a democratic country. And no one can say Maliki faked the results of the election. As a result, my list won in 10 provinces and 10 provincial governors are from my list. Isn't this democracy? But because of this, some people from some political blocs became haters and envious that Maliki's list became strong in the elections and he himself is strong now. They are trying to conspire against or delay the political operations. But to be fair, some of the political blocs now realize or understand that this was for their benefit. And the Iraqi people now understand who is just talking and who is talking and doing. Let's go back to Basra. Even at that time, the American forces called me many times to come back to Baghdad because they said it was too dangerous there. But I was firm in my response: "I will not come back to Baghdad unless we either won the battle in Basra or because I've been killed." Everybody wanted to drag me back to Baghdad. They said, "Baghdad needs you also." I told them, "If I don't win in Basra, there will be no Baghdad."
WSJ: Do you feel like you've changed from 2006 to now? In the beginning, you said you didn't ask to be prime minister, it was a burden for you. But in the provincial elections, you seemed to embrace your role as prime minister and the leader of your list. Maybe you don't enjoy your role now, but perhaps you are more comfortable being prime minister?
Mr. Maliki: I wasn't afraid or thought it was dangerous for me to be prime minister. But being prime minister was not something I wanted to be. It's not because I'm afraid of responsibility. Frankly, I was forced to be prime minister, but I didn't want the country to be without a prime minister for a long time. I was under pressure from all the blocs, the Sunnis, Shias, the Kurds. For more than a month, I was very upset and I felt uncomfortable. I did have other plans inside [the] parliament, some related to me and some related to the party. But at least now I can say that I've done something for my country so I feel better about it.
WSJ: You seem to disagree with people who say you have too much power and you control too many things. You talk about how this power-sharing system slows things down, the ministers are not from your party and don't listen to you. What are the reasons you think you actually don't have enough power?
Mr. Maliki: The management of the country is more difficult now than the security situation because of the power sharing and accordance policy. The minister feels like he is responsible to his bloc, not to the prime minister or the government. But I'm working on ministries and other places to end this power sharing, which is delaying the performance and work of the government. I'm working on canceling the accordance democracy. It doesn't mean that anyone who wins in the elections deserves a place in the ministries. Like any bloc who has 50 plus one can constitute the ministry but if he doesn't have 50 plus one, he should cooperate or have a coalition with another party to get this 50 plus one. If you can't get this, you should just work in parliament and not have a ministry.
WSJ: What is your vision for the next elections and do you really believe you can put together a national list with different sects, different religions, and different ethnicities when there are still problems between all these groups that are dividing them?
Mr. Maliki: The past elections depended on ethnicities or sects and this is very dangerous in political operations. This was something important to establish the political operations in the past, but now there is no need for this. So we should head to a national project. And the national project can include all the sides, Sunni, Shias, Kurds, Christians because it doesn't depend on identity. It's just important that he believes in the unity and sovereignty of Iraq.
So now when I announce the national project and wrote the principles of this project, I found there are no differences between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. And what makes the national project stronger is that I practiced this idea by myself because I've taken on everyone, Sunnis and Shias. This proves that I work on a national project
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1248...cle-outset-box